Speech - Evan Hays

AP Lang Comp-Final Speech

            It was 1963; the Pathet Lao Communist insurgency was spreading. A project of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, the Pathet Lao had been conducting a successful guerilla war against a helpless democratic government of Laos. By blending in with the neutral citizens, insurgents could infiltrate as far into government held territory as Vientiane. But change was on the horizon. A counterinsurgency, formed by Colonel Bill Lair of the CIA’s Special activities division, had been steadily eliminating and resisting communist influence in the country. The force was made up entirely of ethnic tribesmen from within Laos, the total number of American’s in country numbered four, and the war was being won. Yet, within the next eight years, the population of American soldiers and boots on the ground would climb to almost 30,000, American jets would drop napalm on Pathet Lao insurgents and on many occasions, innocent Lao supposed to back the American forces. In 1972, American forces left Laos in order to “maintain neutrality and peace”, The Communist Regime captured Vientiane that next year.

         In 2002, The CIA created and executed operation JACKHAMMER, whereby a force of 300 Special Forces coordinators and soldiers were sent to Afghanistan to work with Northern Alliance forces to capture and kill Taliban Officials. The plan was a resounding success; civilian causalities were slim to none. During the Battle of Tora Bora, US CAG Operators came within 2 miles of Osama Bin Laden’s position, and had they been allowed into Pakistan, Osama would have been captured. Its been 13 years, troop concentrations in Afghanistan have climbed to an average of 30,000, during the height of the war spending climbed to 685.6$ Billion dollars. Very parallel to the situation in Laos seen a half century before, the increased involvement of US military elements has corresponded with an increase in public backlash, civilian casualties, and detrimented the overall war effort.

         So how then, do we win a war without fighting it? It seems that the more in depth we involve ourselves with a counterinsurgency, the more we are crippled. This is true; involvement in a conflict does not always translate to commitment to the issues behind it. The war in Afghanistan can be won, but not through superior force. As Colonel Robert B. Rheault of the Green berets wrote in his briefing on Counterinsurgency in Vietnam, “ We don’t need more men, we need more committed men. The war in Vietnam will take one more year of fighting for every 10,000 men we send here for one year. We should just send 2,000 for 5 years and by the end of that tour of duty they will fight better than any superior number”(Rheault 13). Colonel Rheault understood that the most dangerous weapon against an insurgent is a soldier that knows exactly what his opponent does. A proper insurgency must be conducted with total knowledge of the local area and culture, and in a place such as Afghanistan where information is as sparing as it can come, the only way to fully understand the “public diplomacy” as General David Petraeus, author of the “Counterinsurgency Field Manual” is to establish long lasting connections and friendships with local leaders. When a tour of duty is relegated to less than a year in the field, this is impossible.

         In a recent speech the new secretary of defense, Mr. Ashton Carter was recorded saying, “though usually our attempts at fighting a terrorist force are outdated, such as the war on cyber-terrorism, in many senses the war in Afghanistan is too technologically dependent”(Carter, Speech). Mr. Carter, a Harvard Graduate with a degree in Medieval History, has made a point to emphasize that by fighting with a military and ethical structure from our modern perspective, we are at a disadvantage. The Taliban was known to cut off the hands of its disloyal subjects; in contrast, we are known to accidentally destroy the homes of scared and helpless people. This is in part due to the over complication of the war, in the pursuit of troop safety we have developed long range weapons systems that can indiscriminately kill. This sacrifices the essential human element. This is a war, there will be casualties. What does it say about our military when to save our fighters lives we attack civilian homes? That said, our treatment of the citizenry must be more kind. In contrast, our treatment of any potential terrorist must be decisive and brutal. Colonel Rheault was able to clear his sector of any NVA or VC soldiers within the first 3 months of his 12-month detail because he only asked one question. When a potential insurgent was found, he would ask “are you VC” and if they said yes, they were pardoned, if they said no, the were interned. These processes got Rheault punished, and after the extra-judicial execution of two VC double agents. We must understand that if upholding peace means a few, quick, brutal acts of justice and retribution, then it is infinitely justified as opposed to a long, protracted, war of attrition in which the only result is ambiguity.

         Truthfully, the situation in Afghanistan is one that is heavily nuanced, as Sergeant Matt Kearney stated in the documentary “Korengal”, about the various ethnic and religious ties, “really you never know who exactly is who, the same guys who I was paying to kill the bad guys yesterday is also getting money to kill me. Really it just takes time to figure everything out”. For me to claim that any one solution will be the decisive blow to the Afghan terror cell would be foolish. That said, we have been in this war before, but it was in the jungles of Vietnam where blood was spilt. These are just lessons learned and wisdom synthesized. It doesn’t take a genius to know that quality of a soldier beats quantity, though apparently it takes a congressman to overlook that fact. In the end the words of Tacitus remain true, “the war can only be won after the battle”. This will take a long time to win, but if we develop a consistent force of our army and take away the overcomplicated technological dependence, results will increase in our favor. As Captain Willerd said while traveling up the Nung River looking for the ultimate counterinsurgent, Colonel Kurtz, “If you are getting off the boat, be ready to go all the way.”

Bibliography

Korengal. Dir. Sebastian Junger. Gold Crest Films, 2008. Netflix.

Patraeus, David. Counterinsurgency Field Manual. 1st ed. Vol. 1. N.p.: United States Military, n.d. Print. Ser. 1.

Warner, Roger. "Shooting at The Moon." Steerford Press, 1996. Web.

Schudel, Matt. "Robert B. Rheault, Green Beret Commander in Vietnam Scandal, Dies at 87." Washington Post. N.p., 26 Oct. 2013. Web.